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Abstract
The paper contributes to the research field as the first quantitative study deploying OECD Tax
administration database to provide empirical evidence with respect to the impact of Tax administra-
tion resources on income inequality. Methodologically speaking, we apply, for the unique data set of
46 countries extracted from OECD Tax administration 2015 database, the cross-sectional multiple
regression employing the OLS estimator before justifying with other estimators i.e. truncated
regression, quantile regression and weighted least squared (WLS). We finally obtain the robustly
negative relationship between Tax administration resources (employees and non-salary expenditure)
and income inequality as hypothesize. The paper ends with some policy recommendations following
the limitations and directions for further research.
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ABBREVIATIONS (Abbr.)
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
EU European Union
G20 Group of Twenty - an international forum for the governments and
central bank governors from 20 major economies.
WDI World Development Indicators
WIID World Income Inequality database
WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators
GINI Gini coefficients extracted from World Development Indicators (WDI)
GINI_WIID Gini coefficients extracted from World Income Inequality Database
TE Tax employee
NSE Non-salary expenditure
RL Rule of law
GE Government effectiveness
CC Corruption control
RQ Regulatory quality
UE Unemployment
NC Natural capital
ILO International Labor Organization
GPDpc GPD per capita
OLS Ordinary least squared
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1. Introduction
Inequality in general and inequality in income distribution together with the way how inequality
is generated and operated in particular has been considered a major concern and drawn the
remarkable attention of researchers, economists and policy makers for decades. It can be easily seen
a considerable number of papers working on this research matter and contributing to the research
field with different inequality determinants i.e. institutional quality (Chong & Gradstein, 2007;
Fuentes et al., 2014; Perera & Lee, 2013. . . ), unemployment rate (Galbraith et al., 1999; Aaberge et
al., 2000; Helpman et al., 2010. . . ), economic growth (Kuznets, 1955; Aghion et al., 1999; Barro,
2000. . . ), educational attainment level (Gregorio & Lee, 2002; Yang & Qiu, 2016; Breen & Chung,
2015. . . ), natural resource endowment (Auty, 1997; Gylfason & Zoega, 2002; Fum & Hodler, 2010;
Carmignani, 2013. . . ) and so on. However, the relationship between income inequality and Tax
administration resources seems far from being well understood. And it is likely that there have not
been found any available empirical paper mentioning about the role of Tax administration resources
to income distribution inequality.
In order to close this gap in the research field, the paper makes a combination of literature on
GINI determinants and Taxation administration for elaborating the contribution and effect of Tax
administration resources on income equality (or “social welfare”). To some certain extent, it seems
the fact that Tax administration as a part of “service paradigm” accompanied with traditional
“enforcement paradigm” and “trust paradigm” might help serve as a large set of alternative strategies
to reduce Tax evasion (Alm, 2012). This outcome in case of being well accompanied with efficiency
in Tax transfer in the areas of Tax governance, enforcement and compliance would be expected to
diminish or even avoid the “leaky bucket” on the process of income redistribution for getting more
equality and better social welfare (Browning, 2008) by deteriorating the deadweight loss. In addition,
as stated by Chong and Calderon (2000), institutional framework is linked with how a society’s
gains are distributed and redistributed among its members, it seems the institutional quality plays
an indispensable role in income distribution.
The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with income inequality to investigate the
other potential determinants besides the existing ones that may explain this phenomenon. In details,
it is to explore the effect of Tax administration with regards to resources employment i.e. Tax
administration-related employees and non-salary expenditure on providing the necessary condition
on Income inequality reduction, and to examine the effect of institutional factors on explaining
income inequality across countries. These are actualized by finding the answers to the following
questions saying “Do number of Tax administration employees relate negatively to the likelihood of
income inequality?”, “How is income inequality different among countries, in terms of non-salary
expenditure?”, and “Does institutional quality matter for income distribution inequality? If so,
how?” And after that, we would make some policy recommendations for the improvement of income
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inequality to achieve a better social welfare.
The study contributes to social welfare in relation to income redistribution, Tax transfer efficiency,
and Taxation with the stress on Tax administration literature in some ways. This research paper
aims to identify the new and potential factors that might help explain the inequality of income
distribution along with the existing determinants. To add on, by using OECD Tax administartion
database and presenting cross-country evidence, it is the first quantitative empirical study, to the
best of our knowledge, to bring to the field of research with the role of Tax administration on
account of resources allocation, especially the number of Tax employees and non-salary expenditure
of Tax administration-related functions in reduction of likelihood of income inequality throughout
the World, including both OECD and non-OECD countries. Additionally, the contribution of
institutional factors to predicting the phenomenon is also mentioned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is about theoretical backgrounds in
which we review the relevant papers and literature underlying reasons for proposed hypotheses. The
methodology is discussed in the third section before the results shown in section 4. Then, section 5
deals with discussion and conclusion, followed by some limitations and future research in section 6.
The last section ends the paper with some implications for policy makers.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
The paper generally discusses about the determinants of income inequality with the special focus
on the impact of Tax administration resources on income inequality as a proxy of social welfare
based on income redistribution, besides the review of existing literature on relevant determinants of
income inequality underlying reasons for proposing the hypotheses.
2.1. Inequality and Tax administration
It was argued by Leach (2004) that competitive markets have considerably devoted to material
well-being, but they are always with their flaws. A better level of material welfare might thus be
obtained if the government operates in consort with the market system in order to mend these flaws
and moderate its harsher tendencies. On the one hand, the government tends to repair the market
for improving the resource allocation (first theorem). On the other hand, it is the redistribution
of income (second theorem). However, it was also stated that if a Pareto optimal (or “first best”)
allocation cannot be reached, policy decisions revolve around making appropriate compromises.
And, the best available compromise is believed to be the “second best” allocation.
The second theorem argues that if the government wish to achieve a more equitable distribution
of income, it need only transfer income from the economically advantaged to the economically
disadvantaged i.e. the Government tax those who are initially earning the high wage and subsidize
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those who are initially earning the low wage. Taxes, for example, are levied on the purchases of
goods and the receipt of income. And welfare payments are made to those who have no other source
of income. It is the redistribution of income in favor of social justice and efficiency (Leach, 2004). In
other words, redistribution can be accomplished without a loss of economic efficiency.1 However, in
reality, redistributive policies often entail a loss of economic efficiency. This optimal redistribution
holds if and only if the redistribution is lump-sum (“first best”) which is impossible due to incentive
incompatibility. A deadweight loss will doubtlessly result from any attempt to redistribute income.
The government can then reduce efficiency losses but cannot entirely eliminate them. As a result,
it was suggested that a government, which is intent on redistribution, should design its policies
including a tax system with the correct degree of progressivity as “second best” through tagging and
targeting policies (Leach, 2004). Because one of the effects of a progressive income tax is to reduce
inequality in the distribution of income (Creedy, 1994). Taxes are, according to Wilkinson (1992),
also used to redistribute income; and, for Keynesians, they take a part in demand management
in the society, added to the role of allocation resources. Over and above, it is suggested that the
design of redistributive policies is extremely important to the extent of the negative link between
the deadweight loss associated with income transfer between the rich and the poor. In this case, tax
policy could play a main role in making the post-tax income distribution less unequal. And, tax
policy is crucial for raising revenues to finance public expenditure on transfers, health and education
that tend to favor low-income households, to the same extent as on growth-enabling infrastructure
that can also increase social equity (Carter & Matthews, 2012). All of these afore-discussed help
indicate the close relationship between taxation and equality in income distribution as argued that
“the income tax is more efficient than the legal system in redistributing income” (Kaplan & Shavell,
1994). More importantly, it was declared that tax and transfer systems can reduce overall income
inequality in all countries. On average across the OECD, three quarters of the reduction in inequality
is due to transfers while the rest to direct household taxation (OECD, 2012).
To the extent of Taxation and Tax administration, it is said that tax is one of two only things certain
in life and at least far from inevitable, resulting in a variety of actions to reduce the tax liabilities
(Alm, 2012). Tax avoidance is acknowledged to be the change of the behavior in order to reduce
the tax liability; there is thus nothing illegal and it was called “the only intellectual pursuit that
carries any reward” by John Maynard Keynes (Rosen & Gayer, 2009). On the contrary, tax evasion
is failing to pay legally due tax. It is regarded as illegal and intentional actions taken by individuals
to decrease their legally due tax obligations. And, it has been found widespread everywhere all over
the World (Alm, 2012), because the lump-sum tax is believed to be the only tax that cannot be
evaded, resulting from being not linked to anything within the control of the taxpayer (Leach, 2004).
1See Bakija, J. (2014). The deadweight loss (net reduction in aggregate economic surplus in society) from taxation means
that redistribution from rich to poor makes the rich worse off by more than it makes the poor better off when measured in
currencies.
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Tax administration deals with collecting and processing tax revenue. As being said by Leach (2004)
that “everyone would be better off if no one attempted to evade the tax”, tax transfer efficiency (or
“income redistribution”) will therefore spend the concentration on tax evasion as an evidence, the
tax governance, compliance and enforcement, and the efficiency in managing the transfer bucket as
optimal by limiting the leakage on the way as well, so that redistributive bucket is truly beyond
being only a sieve before embarking on a further expansion in welfare policies (Browning, 2008).
The things that people do to avoid paying taxes alter the allocation of resources in ways that
reduce economic welfare (Leach, 2004). In this sense, it is implied that the Tax administration
is of course highly correlated with the effectiveness and efficiency of Taxation through the role of
income redistribution. Put differently, the effectiveness of Tax administration will perhaps lead to
the income transfer efficiency with the aim of retaining a greater social welfare (or “income equality”)
by a minimal deadweight loss. Taken together, Tax administration might be expected to have the
influence on social welfare or income distribution of society.
With a view to Tax administration operations, it always needs costs of running the tax system i.e.
the costs of administering the income tax because no tax system is costless to administer (Rosen
& Gayer, 2009). Tax administrative costs are the costs of collecting and processing tax revenue
(Salanie, 2003). Enhancing tax administration effectiveness entails improvement of tax compliance
and enforcement, but lowering collection costs (OECD, 2012). And, Tax administration as “service
paradigm” together with traditional “enforcement paradigm” and “trust paradigm” will form a large
set of alternative strategies to reduce tax evasion (Alm, 2008).
For achieving this target, it seems clear for the demand of resources facilitating the effectiveness.
It is said that the overall level of resources devoted to tax system administration is a critical and
thematic issue for governments, revenue organizations and external observers (OECD, 2015).
Moreover, being recorded as the most popular inequality index that is mostly associated with the
descriptive approach to inequality measurement (Bellù & Liberati, 2006), the Gini coefficient is well
established as a conventional, ad hoc measure of income inequality (Dorfman, 1979). These things
might cause Gini coefficient to be used as a proxy for social welfare.
In brief, Tax administration in view of resources allocation might be used with Tax employees (proxy
for tax inspectors) and non-salary expenditure i.e. the share of Tax administration’s aggregate
expenditure with the exception of salary costs. And, it is our hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 1. The tax administration resources are negatively associated with the likelihood of
income distribution inequality across countries.
It appears reasonable and logical to expect that the appropriate and remarkable number of Tax
administration staffs may contribute to higher income equality. We would thus propose that:
Hypothesis 1.a. The higher number of Tax administration-related employees, the lower rate of
income inequality (lower Gini coefficient) across countries
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Aside from the salary costs, it is necessary for governments to make the appropriate allocation of
non-salary expenditure. It is well recognized that IT, HRM, infrastructure . . . have attracted the
increasingly large share among resources for the effectiveness and efficiency targets. It was found in
Carter and Matthews (2012) that the use of new IT systems in revenue administrations increasingly
embrace instruments such as sophisticated risk engines to explore potential missing revenues.
Also, efforts to curb offshore non-compliance by information exchange among tax authorities more
effectively have been given a new impetus. With the same token, tax evaders, who are often wealthy,
have fewer places to hide their money.
It is our expectation to find the negative relationship between Tax administration’s non-salary
expenditure and the propensity of income inequality. Hence, we predict that:
Hypothesis 1.b. The higher proportion of non-salary expenditure in Tax administration, the lower
rate of income inequality (lower Gini coefficient) across countries
2.2. Inequality and other relevant variables
Besides Tax administration resources as the determinant of income inequality, as regards the existing
literature on inequality, there have been accumulated a wide range of literature dealing with various
inequality determinants and sources.
It can be seen that Browning and Johnson (1984) discussed about the tradeoff between equity
and efficiency, and that “the marginal cost of reducing income inequality with a policy that has
distributional effects similar to the present tax-transfer system is quite high even for modest labor
supply elasticities”. Whereas, it was stated “Income inequality leads to increased mortality via
disinvestment in social capital” (Kawachi et al., 1997). Sarel (1997) developed a cross-section
empirical framework to examine the relationship between macroeconomic environment as well as
the trends in income distribution. And, it was found higher growth rate, higher income level, higher
investment rate, real depreciation, and improvement in terms of trade would be associated with
improvement in income distribution.
Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) considered the increase of level of corruption due to income inequality
through material and normative mechanisms.
Recently, Lee et al. (2013) reviewed the trends and identified the determinants of income inequality
in Korea from 1980 to 2012 in which they discovered the impact of macroeconomic index such as the
government spending, investment share, population are the important factors in widening the gap
of income inequality. However, both Kuznets’ hypothesis of inverted U-shaped relationship between
income inequality and economic growth and Barro’s hypothesis of U-shaped relationship are not
empirically supported.
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Yunker (2016) dealt with this issue on a different way. He mentioned the overall relationship between
economic inequality and optimal redistribution, as well as specific insights into the effect of various
economic parameters on this relationship.
In addition to these generally income inequality- related issues, there has been found with a great
amount of literature dealing with particular aspects of income inequality as determinants.
2.2.1. Inequality and institutions
It is said that the institutional framework is linked with not only economic performance, but also how
a society’s gains are distributed and redistributed among its members, that is, with the distribution
of income (Chong & Calderon, 2000).
First of all, talking about the relationship between income inequality and institutional quality,
Chong and Calderon (2000) presented the first systematic cross-section empirical research between
institutions and the distribution of income. It was generally found a negative correlation, say, the
lower the quality of the institutions, the higher the degree of income inequality. However, it was
also stated that institutional quality displayed a significantly and robustly quadratic relationship
with income inequality. To be specific, for poor countries institutional quality was found positively
linked with income inequality, but the opposite effect for rich countries.
Meanwhile, the paper “Inequality and institutions” by Chong and Gradstein (2007) presented “theory
and evidence on the relationship between inequality and institutional quality”. The authors exhibited
a model illustrating the mutual dynamical reinforcement for testing this relationship by sing a
broad array of institutional measures. And it was empirically established with the double causality
between a more equal distribution of income and institutional strength with employment of dynamic
panel and linear feedback analysis.
Sharing the theme, Fuentes et al. (2014) argued that the deterioration of institutional quality influ-
ences skilled labor mobility across sectors (in developing economies) thereby decreasing (increasing)
long term income inequality. And, there found the negative effect of institutional quality on long
term income inequality.
Plus, Perera and Lee (2013) contributed to the research field with finding that “improvements in
corruption, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality are associated with a worsening of
the income distribution” in Asia. This led to recommendations of taking measures for improving
the level of institutional quality in developing countries of East and South Asia on addressing the
problems of poverty and income distribution.
Taking all of above-mentioned literature into account, we expect to see a negative relationship
between income inequality and institutional quality. We then hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2. The income distribution inequality (Gini coefficient) is greater in countries with lower
institutional quality i.e. weaker rule and law
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2.2.2. Inequality and unemployment
Next, the previous literature has demonstrated the association of inequality and unemployment.
In “Inequality and Unemployment in Europe: The American Cure”, it was concluded with the
positive relationship between inequality and unemployment across the European continent, within
countries, between countries and through time (Galbraith et al., 1999). On the one hand, inequality
was considered to be the cause of unemployment as the expression of frustration with low-wage
work. On the other hand, unemployment itself also brought inequality showing that in the periodic
slumps and recoveries of the United States, this appeared to be the principal chain of cause and
effect. To be in line with this research interest, Aaberge et al. (2000) paid attention to the link
of unemployment shocks and income distribution with respect to “how the Nordic countries i.e.
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden fared during their crises? of late 1980s and early 1990s when
unemployment rose dramatically. Anyhow, it was suggested that the Gini coefficient, a standard
measure of inequality, was surprisingly stable in all these 4 countries during the referred time. In
addition, it was Helpman et al. (2010) in “Inequality and Unemployment in a global economy” who
developed a new framework for “examining the determinants of wage distributions emphasizing
within-industry reallocation, labor market frictions, and differences in workforce composition across
firms”. In this paper, it was said that the opening of trade fostered wage inequality and could either
raise or reduce unemployment. At the same time, wage inequality was found higher in a trade
equilibrium than in autarky, gradual trade liberalization exaggerated at the beginning and later
diminished the inequality.
With the literature on unemployment – inequality association, it is likely to be noted that unem-
ployment ought to be treated as a determinant of Gini coefficient. This can thus facilitate the
appropriateness for us to treat “unemployment” as a control variable in this paper.
2.2.3. Inequality and natural resources
As regards the literature on Gini’s determinants, it should be noted with the link between inequality
and natural resources that Academics have so far put into research. In fact, resource curse has drawn
the considerable attention of academics, economists and policymakers in the sense that natural
resource might be an economic curse instead of a blessing (Auty, 1997). It was pointed out by Leamer
et al. (1999) that natural resource abundance might increase Latin American income inequality
and income inequality was higher in this region than in East Asia. This was possible to explain by
the fact that natural-resource-intensive sectors often absorb capital that might otherwise flow to
manufacturing, resulting in depression of workers’ incentive to accumulate skill and industrialization
delays.
Being on the same platform, Gylfason and Zoega (2002) demonstrated in theory as well as empirically
that the “increased dependence on natural resources tends to go along with less rapid economic growth
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and greater inequality in the distribution of income across countries”. And, natural resources were
declared to “raise income inequality in ethnically polarized societies, but reduce income inequality
in ethnically homogenous societies” (Fum & Hodler, 2010). Later, it was explained by Goderis
and Malone (2011) about “the time path of income inequality following natural resource booms in
resource-rich countries”. In other words, they proposed and justified that inequality fell immediately
after a boom, and then rose steadily over time until the disappearance of boom’s initial impact under
“the condition of a relatively unskilled labor intensive nontraded sector”, especially for oil and mineral
booms. Besides that, uncertainty about future commodity prices would increase long-run inequality.
Also, Carmignani (2013) by the paper entitled “Development outcomes, resource abundance, and
the transmission through inequality” conducted studies and found evidence supporting the positive
effect of resource abundance on the inequality of income distribution within a country.
Taking together, the afore-discussed papers reveals the truth that, it may be worth using natural
capital as control variable in our paper in the field that “The more increasing dependence on natural
resources, the greater inequality in the distribution of income across countries”.
2.2.4. Inequality and Economic growth
Among the relevant literature on determinants of income inequality, economic growth has been
regarded as the classical factor. This is illustrated by Kuznets (1955) when showing character and
causes of long- term changes in the personal distribution of income, particularly the potentially
non-linear relationship between inequality and development (hereafter called Kuznets curve). Aghion
et al. (1999) analyzed the perspective of the new growth theories on the basis of inequality - economic
growth correlation. On examining the effect of inequality on growth, it was stated that it is not
a necessity of a trade-off between equity and efficiency in case of imperfect capital markets. On
the other hand, it was drawn attention with indicating several mechanisms whereby growth may
raise wage inequality, both across and within education cohorts. At the same time, Barro (2000)
contributed to the research field with evidence from a broad panel of countries showing little overall
relation between income inequality and rates of growth i.e. higher inequality tends to hinder growth
in poor countries and advance growth in richer places.
It seems undeniable that there occurs the impact of economic growth on income inequality, to some
extent. That is hence the reason why we decide to take it into account in the form of an additional
control variable.
2.2.5. Inequality and Education
As other potential determinants of income inequality, education has been acknowledged to be a piece
of the issue. Gregorio and Lee (2002) raised the idea that education is related to income distribution.
In more details, educational factors i.e. higher educational attainment and more equal distribution
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of education were thought to play a significant role in advance the equality of income distribution.
Furthermore, it was mentioned by Yang and Qiu (2016) about the impact of education on income
inequality and intergenerational mobility. They argued that innate ability and family investment in
early education take a crucial role in estimating income inequality and intergenerational income
mobility. Nonetheless, Breen and Chung (2015) argued that the between-education contribution to
inequality is small, even when it is considered with only adjusted inequality omitting the within-
person component. As well, feasible educational policy was asserted to have only a limited impact
on income inequality.
In brief, in light of the relevant literature entailing the relationship between education and inequality,
it should not be doubtful reason to use education as a candidate for additional control variable in
our paper.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample and data collection
The paper, based on OECD Tax administration database 2015, initially employs a chosen set of 56
advanced and emerging economies including all 34 OECD and 22 non-OECD countries i.e. EU and
G20 members. Due to missing values of Gini coefficients and non-salary expenditure, we ultimately
work with 46 countries. The full list of these countries will be found in Appendix 1.
The unique data set is expected to collect with variables corresponding to regression and regressors
from published sources, i.e. World Bank, WDI, WIID, WGI, and OECD.
3.2. Data description
The entire list of variables that have been applied with their sources in details can be found in
Appendix 2. We consider, besides Tax administration resources variables - employees and non-salary
expenditure, some explanatory variables with the role of “control variables” to observe the influences
on social welfare in particular the income inequality. Here in this subsection, we would explain
briefly the key variables that have been used.
3.2.1. Gini coefficients
Income inequality is estimated by Gini index. It is a uni-dimensional index measuring Inequality for
socio-economic impact of policies through the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in
some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates
from a perfectly equal distribution (World Bank).
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We deploy the Gini coefficients extracted from World Development Indicators (WDI) - World Bank
estimate (hereafter called GINI) averaged over 5 years (2008-2012) to compensate for the scattering
and insufficiency of Gini coefficients in some cases.
Furthermore, for the purpose of results’ consistency check, we also use Gini coefficients basically
extracted from World income inequality database - WIID (hereafter called GINI_WIID). Owing to
the varying levels and sources of reports, and considerable missing values, we scan the available
comparable data and then average the Gini coefficients over the afore-referred period from 2008 to
2012.
The Gini index, used as dependent variable, is of the interval between 0 and 1 in which 0 represents
perfect equality, while an index of 1 implies perfect inequality.
3.2.2. Tax employee
The first independent variable, denoted Tax employee (TE), measures the number of Tax adminis-
tration staffs over every 10,000 active citizens (aged 15-64) in which, the former is extracted from
OECD Tax administration database and, and the latter is adopted from WDI (World Bank).
The paper utilizes the log Tax employee to see the elasticity of GINI with respect to the number of
Tax employees.
3.2.3. Tax administration’s non-salary expenditure
Non-salary expenditure (NSE), the second independent variable, represents the share of non-salary
expenditure for Tax administration-related functions, covering infrastructures, information technology
(IT), human resource management (HRM). . . The variable is the share, calculated by the rest of
aggregate expenditure for all Tax administration – related functions after total salary costs for all
Tax administration – related functions i.e. 1 - (salary expenditure/aggregate expenditure). It is
adopted from OECD Tax administration database.
3.2.4. Rule of law
Rule of law (RL), an institutional indicator, is used as a proxy for the quality of institutions that is
extracted from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). This index ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 where
positive number indicates a higher quality.
In fact, all of four institutional indicators (rule of law - RL, government effectiveness - GE, corruption
control - CC, and regulatory quality - RQ) have the same effect on GINI (in this model). And, they
are highly correlated.2 Therefore, we decide to use rule of law (RL) showing the strength of law and
order as the best fit to be the representative of institutional quality index.3
2See Appendix 3. Correlation matrix among institutional variables
3See Appendix 4. Baseline regression model with different institutional indicators
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3.2.5. Control variables
The control variables are unemployment (UE) and natural capital (NC).
UE refers to the rate of unemployment of total labor force, and is extracted from International
Labor Organization (ILO), Key indicators of the labor market database WDI.
And, NC per capita used as a proxy for natural resources abundance demonstrates the log natural
capital per capita (US$) in the most recent statistics of 2005. This variable is extracted from World
Bank (2011).
3.2.6. Additional control variables
Besides, we also introduced some variables for controlling the omitted variables.
To evaluate the economic production and growth, we use the logarithm of GDPpc extracted from
WDI. Also, in order to control the educational attainment, we acquire the average years of schooling
corresponding to levels (total, primary, secondary, tertiary).
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of main variables used in the paper.
3.3. Econometric methods and Model
3.3.1. Method
The paper is basically applied with Cross-sectional multiple regression employing the OLS estimator
in Stata and then, for robustness check, it is justified with other estimators i.e. truncated regression
and weighted least squared.
It is acknowledged that, in order to estimate a model with multiple outcomes, it can be utilized with
multiple regressions for cross-sectional data to learn more about the relationship between several
predictor variables and a criterion variable (Wooldridge, 2009).
With a unique data set of 46 countries, the explained variable – GINI and all explanatory and
control variables (TE, NSE, RL, UE, NC, etc...) are associated with one period or point in time
– 2000s, the choice of a cross-sectional regression appears to be appropriate. Due to the specific
characteristics of the variables, especially GINI, this paper fails to address a time-series regression
or longitudinal regression in which the variables are considered to be associated with a sequence of
points in time to witness any change trend during time or causal relationship then (Wooldridge,
2009).
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Figure 1: The distribution of main variables (vertical line represents the mean values).
3.3.2. Model
GINI = β0 + β1 × [Tax employee] + β2 × [Non− salary expenditure] + β3 × [Rule of law]+
+
∑
δi × [Controli] + 
in which Control is a vector of control variables entailing unemployment rate (UE) and log natural
capital per capita (NC), and E is error term.
Table 1 shows correlations among major variables employed in the paper.
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Abbr. GINI log(TE) NSE UE RL log(NC)
Gini coefficients GINI 1
log(Tax employee) TE -0.5821 1
Non-salary expenditure NSE -0.1036 -0.1305 1
Unemployment UE 0.1142 0.1917 0.0129 1
Rule of law RL -0.5201 0.4099 -0.1619 -0.0997 1
log(Natural capital) NC -0.0534 0.1494 -0.0347 -0.2552 0.3216 1
Table 1: Correlation matrix
Table 2 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for all main variables.
Statistics GINI log(TE) NSE UE RL log(NC)
Mean 0.3595 2.2781 0.2863 0.0892 0.8687 9.1258
Median 0.3379 2.6221 0.285 0.0745 0.9850 8.9632
Min 0.2479 -0.6931 0.0500 0.0070 -0.7800 7.6468
Max 0.632 3.5068 0.6900 0.2630 1.9700 11.6097
Standard Deviation 0.0849 0.9152 0.1100 0.0508 0.8408 0.7330
Variance 0.0072 0.8377 0.0121 0.0026 0.7070 0.5373
Standard Error (mean) 0.0125 0.1349 0.0162 0.0075 0.1240 0.1118
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 43
Table 2: Summary statistics
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Main results
Dependent variable: GINI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Tax employee) -0.0562*** -0.0427** -0.0475** -0.0490***
(0.0182) (0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0164)
Non-salary expenditure -0.141* -0.172** -0.174** -0.185**
(0.0777) (0.082) (0.081) (0.0803)
Rule of law -0.0371*** -0.0332*** -0.0376***
(0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0106)
Unemployment 0.305 0.445
(0.304) (0.331)
log(Natural capital) 0.0245*
(0.0136)
Constant 0.528*** 0.538*** 0.519*** 0.298**
(0.0532) (0.0463) (0.0472) (0.135)
Observations 46 46 46 43
R-squared 0.372 0.482 0.513 0.565
P-value 0.0037 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Main estimation results
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Table 3 reports the main results of the paper from the cross-sectional multiple regression with robust
option to control the heteroscedasticity, modeling the relationship between GINI and explanatory
variables as well as how these independent variables help predict GINI. Particularly, it is shown
with the value of the estimated coefficients, the robust standard errors and an indication of the
significance level for each and every model. Observing the R-squared accompanied with p-values, all
of the models are recorded to reach significance levels below 0.01 (1%) and the equivalent variation
in statistics GINI might be explained by independent variables. This may confirm the good fit to
the data. Also, the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are equal to zero is thus rejected
in all these models.
As can be seen from Table 3, starting by model 1 for only two main explanatory variables concerning
Tax administration resources (TE & NSE), it is found that this model is fit and both variables
are statistically significant in explaining GINI. Then, model 2 is added with the third independent
variable - RL. Again, the model is fit and all these three variables are found to be significant.
We then add the two control variables – UE and NC to the models 3 and 4 respectively. It can be
observed that, the two models are with increasing R-squared, especially the model 4 – our baseline
regression - that could explain 56.5% of the GINI’s variation. And all explanatory variables are
found statistically significant. It seems remarkable that, signs of all coefficients appear to be suitable
as expected. That is to say, the coefficients on Tax employee, non-salary expenditure and rule of
law are witnessed to be negative and highly significant at level of 1% and 5%. And these results
therefore generally support all hypotheses. In an average country, Tax administration with the
focus on resources usage represented by Tax administration staffs and non-salary expenditure as
well as the stronger law of public and order may contribute to reducing the inequality of income
distribution. More specific, according to our first hypothesis (H1a), TE is negative and statistically
significant; therefore, the increasing number of Tax administration staffs helps decrease the rate
of income inequality (GINI coefficient). Similarly, NSE is negatively and statistically significant,
revealing the negative relationship between TE and GINI. And, the higher proportion of non-salary
expenditure in Tax administration reduces the degree of income distribution inequality as proposed
in hypothesis H1b.
Regarding the hypothesis H2, the quality of institution factors – RL – tends to be capable of
controlling the GINI. With the negative and statistically significant RL coefficient, it is suggested
that, high GINI countries will be generally witnessed with low RL index, as proposed in hypothesis
3.
In addition, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the robustness of all three independent variables
namely TE, NSE, and RL when they appear and remain strongly significant in all models with
considerable coefficients indicating their robust effect on predicting GINI’s variability, no matter
what the existence of control variables i.e. UE and NC.
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Figure 2 shows the partial effects of these explanatory variables on GINI.
Figure 2: The partial effects of explanatory variables on GINI
4.2. Additional control variables
Then, for the purpose of omitted variables, we add more control variables to the specification.
As shown in table 4, the major results appear to be unchanged when controlling for these afore-
mentioned potential covariates of GINI. The two main hypotheses concerning Tax administration
and institutional quality remain the significance in explaining GINI’s variability in all three models,
say, adding economic production and growth (GDP), total schooling, and other joint variables
of educational attainment respectively. And the noticed thing is that there is not any change in
explanatory power of these three models i.e. (5) (6) and (7) demonstrated by observed R-squared
(around 56%) compared to baseline regression in model (4). This helps confirm the suitability and
validity of the baseline model.
4.3. Further robustness checks
In this sub-section we present some robustness checks as an exercise for the core regression coefficient
estimation. Consequently, it is said that one of the most essential issues is to interpret the impact
of explanatory variables on the variation of GINI at different points of time. We hence generate the
model with the utilization of data 2011. Table 5 presents the outcomes. And then we also make use
of other estimators for checking the findings (see table 6 for details).
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Dependent variable: GINI
(5) (6) (7)
log(Tax employee) -0.0512*** -0.0488*** -0.0482***
(0.0158) (0.0167) (0.0174)
Non-salary expenditure -0.176* -0.185** -0.184**
(0.0887) (0.0815) (0.0842)
Rule of law -0.0455* -0.0373*** -0.0380***
(0.0231) (0.0111) (0.0108)
Unemployment 0.451 0.445 0.458
(0.341) (0.336) (0.348)
log(Natural capital) 0.0223 0.0246* 0.0239
(0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0156)
log(GDPpc) 0.0104
(0.0297)
Total schooling -0.0408
(0.00717)
Primary schooling -0.00259
(0.0123)
Secondary schooling -0.00124
(0.0105)
Tertiary schooling 0.0089
(0.0347)
Constant 0.222 0.300** 0.314*
(0.268) (0.139) (0.168)
Observations 43 43 43
R-squared 0.567 0.565 0.566
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Additional control variable
4.3.1. The baseline regression with data of 20114
Dependent variable: GINI
2013 (4) 2011 (8)
log(Tax employee) -0.0490*** -0.0330*
(0.0164) (0.0192)
Non-salary expenditure -0.185** -0.136*
(0.0803) (0.0793)
Rule of law -0.0376*** -0.0416***
(0.0106) (0.0095)
Unemployment 0.445 0.131
(0.331) (0.170)
log(Natural capital) 0.0245* 0.0210
(0.0136) (0.0143)
Constant 0.298** 0.305**
(0.135) (0.136)
Observations 43 35
R-squared 0.565 0.538
Robust standard errors in parentheses 0.000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Baseline regression with data of 2011
4See Appendix 2 for description of data used in this model
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As seen in table 5, it is likely that the model is still fit with data of 2011. And all of the coefficients
of independent variables i.e. TE, NSE and RL are recorded significantly negative as expected. The
hypotheses remain supported although the expanatory powers of the whole model as well as two
main independent variables i.e. TE and NSE are found rather lowered compared to the baseline
regression i.e. model (4). This means, the relationship between Tax administration resources and
rule of law and income inequality remains.
4.3.2. Application of other techniques for baseline regression
Bearing the nature of GINI i.e. belongs to 0-1 interval, we make the application of truncated regression
for estimation. Moreover, we utilize the weighted least squared estimator for the heteroscedasticity
matter. And, it is then acknowledged that the models are fit, and especially the main results survive
these tests as expected, even the significance of certain variable (NSE) are improved (Table 6).
Particularly, the model (10) with WLS is obtained with the highest explanatory power (R-squared
= 57.48%), and the coefficients of variables NSE and NC are acknowledged to be more strongly
significant at levels of 1% and 5% respectively instead of 5% and 10% in the baseline model.
Dependent variable: GINI
Truncated Reg. (9) WLS (10)
log(Tax employee) -0.0490*** -0.0444***
(0.0154) (0.0162)
Non-salary expenditure -0.185** -0.238***
(0.0754) (0.0726)
Rule of law -0.0376*** -0.0473***
(0.00993) (0.0130)
Unemployment 0.445 0.612
(0.311) (0.390)
log(Natural capital) 0.0245* 0.0392**
(0.0128) (0.0174)
Constant 0.298** 0.162
(0.127) (0.169)
Sigma 0.0559***
(0.0067)
R-squared 0.5748
Observations 43 43
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Baseline regression with truncated regression and weighted least squared (WLS) estimator
4.4. Alternative measure of GINI
In this sub-section, we make a replacement of GINI with GINI_WIID for observing any potential
difference. It is our hope the main results may survive the test.
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Table 7 shows the empirical results with the usage of GINI_WIID5 instead of GINI. And it is the fact
that, all explanatory variables are estimated with significantly negative coefficients, demonstrating
the support for all three above-mentioned hypotheses.
Dependent variable: GINI / GINI_WIID
GINI (4) GINI_WIID (11)
log(Tax employee) -0.0490*** -0.0463**
(0.0164) (0.0174)
Non-salary expenditure -0.185** -0.176**
(0.0803) (0.0723)
Rule of law -0.0376*** -0.0259**
(0.0106) (0.0111)
Unemployment 0.445 0.456
(0.331) (0.358)
log(Natural capital) 0.0245* 0.0217*
(0.0136) (0.0129)
Constant 0.298** 0.319**
(0.135) (0.132)
Observations 43 43
R-squared 0.565 0.496
P-value 0.000 0.0002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Baseline regression with GINI_WIID
Clearly, the choice of GINI might satisfy the research criteria of reliability and validity for “reducing
the possibility of getting the answer wrong means” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.156). In other words, it
is our effort of well selecting and collecting data derived from reliable sources that are relevant to
the research objectives. In this sense, the findings seem really about what they appear to be about
as mentioned in Saunders et al. (2009, p.157).
To conclude this section, taken together these results confirms the robustness of the models, results,
and the significance and explanatory power of independent variables in explaining GINI’s variation
as well. It is also noticeable with the reliability and validity of the data applied in the paper,
particularly the GINI from WDI.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
As referred earlier, the target of this paper is to advance our empirical understanding about the
determinants of income inequality. Specifically, through the proposed hypotheses, we would stress the
5GINI coefficients extracted from World Income Inequality Database - See 3.2. Data description and Appendix 2
for details
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role of Tax administration resources on disciplining the income inequality besides the institutional
quality as GINI’s determinant. The remarkable thing is that, this paper tends to contribute
to the research field by the first time providing empirical evidence with regards to the negative
effect of Tax administration resources on income distribution inequality. The study places the
emphasis on Tax administration practices and performance that, the devotion of resources to Tax
system administration is an important and topical issue for governments (OECD, 2015). Good tax
administration always matters (Carter & Matthews, 2012). In details, in view of amelioration in tax
governance, compliance and enforcement, the suitable number of Tax administration-related function
staffs and the considerable proportion of non-salary expenditure i.e. infrastructure, information
technology (IT), human resource management (HRM). . .might dedicate to fostering the equality of
income distribution (or “social welfare”) by partly eliminating the deadweight loss on the income
transfer process.
The paper shows the empirical results strongly supporting the hypotheses, especially the first two
hypotheses on Tax administration resources’ explanatory power in GINI’s variation. The findings,
via various models, are robust to data 2013, 2011 and even with different techniques (OLS regression,
truncated regression, weighted least squared), to controlling for unemployment rate and natural
capital as well as educational attainment and economic production and growth (GDPpc). The
alternative measure of GINI is also utilized for validation and robustness test, and it is demonstrated
with result survival.
Regarding the first hypothesis on the relationship between Tax administration resources and income
distribution inequality, it appears to be noticeable with this robustly negative association and that
effectiveness of Tax administration to the extent of resources allocation is crucial for moderating the
likelihood of income inequality across countries. More concretely, the results indicate the significantly
negative relationship between the number of Tax administration staffs and the GINI index. That
is to say, on conditional of other relevant factors, in countries possessing higher number of Tax
administration-related functions corresponding to the size of population and economy, it would be
found with lower rate of income inequality. This can be seen with Latin American countries such
as Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, Argentina which have been acknowledged among
the most unequal distribution of income (GINI: 0.44 – 0.55) with the comparably low number of
employees.6
Also, the share of non-salary expenditure i.e. expenditure of Tax administration-related functions
besides total salary expenditure is recorded with negative link to GINI index. This suggests that,
countries with higher proportion of afore-mentioned investment might predict a lower inequality
of income distribution. It seems undeniable that, on the base of supporting tax collection as well
as inspecting and preventing tax fraud and evasion potentials, IT operations giving support for
6See Appendix 6. Data file for details
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administrative operations together with HRM functions providing administrative operations in terms
of personnel, payroll, recruitment, learning and developing. . . have been believed to increasingly
greater, for efficiency and effectiveness, as Governments’ decisions on reducing the public wage costs
for other kind of Tax administration – related investment (OECD, 2015).
As institutional framework is linked with how a society’s gains are distributed and redistributed
among its members (Chong & Calderon, 2000), the institutional quality plays an important role in
income distribution. As far as the second hypothesis on institutional quality represented by rule of
law in this research paper is concerned, our findings support the hypothesis that the strong law and
order diminish the income inequality. This paper, therefore, helps consolidate the previous study by
Chong and Calderon (2000), Chong and Gradstein (2007), Perera and Lee (2013), and Fuentes et
al. (2014) to the extent of causality between institutional strength and a more equal distribution
of income. The Scandinavian countries Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway whose RL index
(among the highest) are 1.8733, 1.9257, 1.9541 and 1.9681 respectively accompanied with 0.2907,
0.2757, 0.2702 and 0.2617 for GINI (among the lowest) are considered clear examples.7 This may
help confirm results from other studies.
It is likely the truth that, organizational and institutional reforms play essential parts in Tax
administration’s effectiveness and efficiency, resulting in the worthy decrease of income distribu-
tion inequality. Taken together, Tax administration with specific respect to resources allocation
accompanied with institutional quality are certified effective and helpful for income equality, to
some certain extent. This also helps commit to the fact that whether the boom of industrialization
and modernization, human always take a certain central position in all fields. Therefore, besides
the institutional quality and non-salary expenditure (investment in technology, automation. . . ), it
appears to be undeniable with the sustainably key role of number of Tax administration-related
officials.
In a nutshell, Tax administration as a part of “service paradigm” relates to the likelihood of social
welfare demonstrated with income distribution measured by GINI index. The findings are novel
in the literature and the paper contributes to the research field as being the first to reveal the
effect of Tax administration in terms of resources deployment on income inequality. And it can
be undeniably recognized with the need of effective Tax administration to gain better efficiency in
income redistribution (or “tax transfer”) for the purpose of higher equality by avoiding the “leaky
bucket” (or minimizing the deadweight loss) on the process of income redistribution as referred in
Browning (2008).
7See Appendix 6. Data file for details
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6. Limitations and future research
It is often witnessed with limitations of any research, and this paper is thus not without its limitations,
opening the fruitful spaces and directions for future research.
In relation to the data set, this paper is limited to 46 countries (fewer than 25% of total Globe) that
mainly belong to high and upper-middle income classification. It might fail to get the generality of
the findings. A further research conducting with a broader and more various collection of data set
would be better in understanding the relationship between Tax administration resources and income
distribution inequality.
Methodologically speaking, the paper uses cross-sectional method, in spite of robustness checks, this
paper fails to address time dimension in which the variables are considered to be associated with a
sequence of points in time to witness any change trend during time or causal relationship then. This
study is hence likely to miss the opportunity to catch the causal effect, suggesting the improvement
with panel approach.
In other respects, owing to the objective limitation caused by Tax administration database that
has been consolidated with only three available versions saying Tax Administration 2006, 2013 and
2015 for 2004, 2011 and 2013 data respectively, resulting in the limited choice of corresponding data
i.e. 2013 and 2011 in this paper. As a consequence, further research overcoming this drawback and
applying bigger and more availably sufficient Tax administration databases in the future would
definitely facilitate the relevant knowledge in terms of other potential aspects of Tax administration
linking to income inequality.
Also, it might be remarkable that more study on this new relationship and effect of Tax administration
on social welfare should be conducted as a hint of this paper. In the meantime, there arises study
with different data to survive the findings over times and examine if the relationship between Tax
administration resources and income inequality remains over the time. This could definitely advance
the better acknowledgement of GINI’s underlying and implicit determinants, navigating the better
policy with reference to income equality and equity.
Furthermore, it is noted with slight limit when this paper basically deals with the effect of Tax
administration to the extent of resources usage and exploitation. In this sense, it would be of
interest to conduct further research discovering this relationship in respect of other aspects of Tax
administration i.e. institutional arrangement of Tax administration, organization of revenue bodies,
strategic management, human resource management, operational performance management. . . , or
even more resource-related variables namely cost of collection ratios, Tax administration expenditure
/ GDP. . . By doing so, that could consolidate the impact as well as explanatory power of Tax
administration on income inequality.
In this paper, tax rates are implicitly assumed equal throughout the countries. That would be hence
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valuable for future research, in view of tax reform, to make effort on trying to correct for tax rates
i.e. tax pressure as stated in the law. Conjointly, interacting rule of law with Tax administration
resources would show light in the respect of policy issue in using current resources more efficiently.
Finally, the paper, with the first time, discovers the mutual link and effect of Tax administration
resources on income inequality when other factors held as equal. It will then be interesting if
future research may further explore and extend this finding and evidence in a deeper way i.e.
examine whether and how this effect will be differently moderated and mediated under the differed
environmental factors such as organizational, institutional, historical, economic, political and social
elements that can dedicate to intervening, advancing or hindering this effect. Additionally, the
research that focuses and analyses this finding under the lens of Inequality and Public economics
instead of Institutional economics would be an another direction.
7. Implications for policy-makers
As mentioned earlier, income inequality has been considered among important issues facing all
nations throughout the World. This could be thanks to the fact that income inequality leads to
increased mortality via disinvestment in social capital (Kawachi et al., 1997) and this phenomenon is
thought to increase the level of corruption through material and normative mechanisms (Jong-Sung
& Khagram, 2005).
From the findings of this paper, it is undeniable that, income inequality may be affected by a variety
of elements besides existing GINI’s determinants i.e. population, economic growth, trade openness,
natural resources abundance, educational attainment, institutional quality. . . Consequently, it should
be paid more attention to legislation of the suitable Tax administration policies. Obviously, the
optimal employment of resources namely considerable number of relevant staffs as well as the notable
Tax administration’s non-salary expenditure could absolutely improve and facilitate more efficiency
in tax collection, leading the better distribution of income through avoidance of redistributive
pressures (Jong-Sung & Khagram, 2005).
In addition, the governments should, to the extent of policy execution, be aware of the combination
of alternative strategies i.e. traditional enforcement paradigm, service paradigm, and trust paradigm
(Alm, 2012) to reduce tax evasion and thus increase the tax transfer efficiency, resulting in better
social welfare with lower income inequality.
And lastly, it finds likely to suggest that increase of Tax administration resources might increase social
welfare. Nevertheless, there still exists a policy issue in using current resources more efficiently. That
hence results in the crucial policy that notices and moderates the interaction of Tax administration
resources and institutional quality indicators as referred previously for future research direction.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of 46 countries in the sample 
No. Country OECD (Yes / No) 
Income Group 
Classification1 
GINI – 
Average 5 years (2008-
2012) 
1 Argentina No Not classified 0.440 
2 Australia Yes High income 0.350 
3 Austria Yes High income 0.310 
4 Belgium Yes High income 0.280 
5 Brazil No Upper middle income 0.540 
6 Bulgaria No Upper middle income 0.350 
7 Canada Yes High income 0.340 
8 Chile Yes High income 0.510 
9 Colombia No Upper middle income 0.550 
10 Costa Rica No Upper middle income 0.490 
11 Croatia No High income 0.320 
12 Cyprus No High income 0.320 
13 Denmark Yes High income 0.290 
14 Estonia Yes High income 0.320 
15 Finland Yes High income 0.280 
16 France Yes High income 0.330 
17 Germany Yes High income 0.310 
18 Hungary Yes High income 0.290 
19 Iceland Yes High income 0.280 
20 India No Lower middle income 0.340 
21 Indonesia No Lower middle income 0.350 
22 Ireland Yes High income 0.320 
23 Israel Yes High income 0.430 
24 Italy Yes High income 0.340 
25 Japan Yes High income 0.320 
26 Latvia No High income 0.350 
27 Lithuania No High income 0.350 
28 Luxembourg Yes High income 0.320 
29 Malaysia No Upper middle income 0.460 
30 Mexico Yes Upper middle income 0.480 
31 Netherlands Yes High income 0.290 
32 Norway Yes High income 0.260 
33 Poland Yes High income 0.330 
34 Portugal Yes High income 0.360 
35 Romania No Upper middle income 0.280 
36 Russia No Upper middle income 0.410 
37 Slovak Republic Yes High income 0.270 
38 Slovenia Yes High income 0.250 
39 South Africa No Upper middle income 0.630 
                                               
1 calculated using the World Bank Atlas method: low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita of $1,045 or less in 2014; 
middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of more than $1,045 but less than $12,736; high-income economies are those with a 
GNI per capita of $12,736 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4,125 
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No. Country OECD (Yes / No) 
Income Group 
Classification1 
GINI – 
Average 5 years (2008-
2012) 
40 Spain Yes High income 0.360 
41 Sweden Yes High income 0.270 
42 Switzerland Yes High income 0.330 
43 Thailand No Upper middle income 0.390 
44 Turkey Yes Upper middle income 0.390 
45 United Kingdom Yes High income 0.340 
46 United States Yes High income 0.400 
 
Appendix 2. Full list of data description, measure and sources  
No. Variable Description Measure & Source 
1. Gini coefficients (GINI) The proxy for social welfare. 
The uni-dimensional index measuring Inequality 
for socio-economic impact of policies. 
Gini index measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income (or, in some cases, 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or 
households within an economy deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots 
the cumulative percentages of total income 
received against the cumulative number of 
recipients, starting with the poorest individual or 
household. The Gini index measures the area 
between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line 
of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of 
the maximum area under the line.  
Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, 
while an index of 1 implies perfect inequality. 
Average GINI over 5 years (2008-
2012), source: WDI - World 
Development Indicators (World bank 
estimate).  
GINI applied for both 2013 and 2011. 
GINI_WIID: extract the data gaps and 
then, average available comparative 
Gini coefficients over the period from 
2008 to 2012. Source: World Income 
Inequality database (WIID).  
GINI_WIID applied for 2013. 
2. Tax employee 
(TE) 
Number of employees of tax administration per 
10,000 active citizens (total citizens aged 15-64) 
 
Calculated by number of 10,000 
active citizens (adopted from World 
Development Indicators – World 
Bank) divided by number of tax 
administration staffs (OECD Tax 
administration 2015 – Table 2.4 for 
2013 & OECD Tax administration 
2013 – Table 2.4 for 2011) 
Usage of log(TE) 
3. Non-salary expenditure 
(NSE) 
This represents the share of non-salary 
expenditure in aggregate expenditure 
 
Calculated by 1 – (minus) proportion 
of salary expenditure (percentage of 
salary costs for tax functions and 
related overheads / aggregate 
expenditure for tax functions and 
related overheads), adopted from 
OECD Tax administration 2015 - 
Table A.6 & A.5 for 2013 & OECD 
Tax administration 2013 – Table 5.1 
for 2011. 
4. Unemployment 
(UE) 
Total unemployment (% of total labor force) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor 
force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment. 
WDI – Adopted from International 
Labor Organization, Key Indicators 
of the Labor Market database. 
Data for year 2013 & 2011 
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No. Variable Description Measure & Source 
5. Rule of law 
(RL) 
An indicator, used as proxy for institutional 
quality, measures the extent to which individuals / 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Ranges from -2.5 to +2.5  
Higher values mean stronger law and order 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) – World Bank 
Data of 2013 & of 2011 
 
6. Natural capital 
(NC) 
A proxy for natural resources abundance 
An important share of total wealth, is the sum of 
nonrenewable resources (including oil, natural 
gas, coal, and mineral resources), cropland, 
pastureland, forested areas (including areas used 
for timber extraction and non-timber forest 
products), and protected areas. 
Most natural resources are valued by taking the 
present value of resource rents—the economic 
profit on exploitation—over an assumed lifetime 
The paper uses log of NC per capita 
(US$) in 2005 – the most up-to-date 
statistics. Source: World Bank 2011 
(Appendix C, Table C.1 – Wealth 
Estimates for 2005). 
Data used for both 2013 and 2011 
7. GDP per capita 
(GDP) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided 
by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
Data of year 2013 & 2011, extracted 
from WDI. 
8. Total schooling 
(TS) 
Average years of total schooling i.e. average years 
of education completed among people over age 15  
 
Data of year 2010, used for both 2013 
and 2011 
Source: The Barro & Lee 
Educational attainment dataset 
version 2.1 (02/2016) - 
http://www.barrolee.com/  
9. Primary schooling (PR) Average years of primary schooling among people 
over age 15  
Data of year 2010, used for both 2013 
and 2011 
Source: The Barron & Lee 
Educational attainment dataset 
version 2.1 (02/2016) - 
http://www.barrolee.com/  
10. Secondary schooling 
(SE) 
Average years of secondary schooling among 
people over age 15 
Data of year 2010, used for both 2013 
and 2011 
Source: The Barron & Lee 
Educational attainment dataset 
version 2.1 (02/2016) - 
http://www.barrolee.com/  
11. Tertiary schooling 
(TR) 
Average years of tertiary schooling among people 
over age 15 
Data of year 2010, used for both 2013 
and 2011 
Source: The Barron & Lee 
Educational attainment dataset 
version 2.1 (02/2016) - 
http://www.barrolee.com/  
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Appendix 3. Correlation matrix among institutional variables 
 RL RQ GE CC 
     
Rule of law 1 
   
(RL)   
  
Regulatory quality 
(RQ) 
0.926 1  
 
Government effectiveness 0.9635 0.9117 1  
(GE)     
Corruption control 
(CC) 
0.9716 0.8969 0.9603 1 
 
Appendix 4. Baseline regression model with different institutional indicators 
Dependent variable: GINI 
  (4) (12) (13) (14) 
log(Tax employee) 0.0490*** 0.0516*** 0.0508*** 0.0514*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0168) 
Non-salary expenditure -0.185** -0.165** -0.183** -0.192** 
 (0.0803) (0.0782) (0.0801) (0.0772) 
Unemployment 0.445 0.481 0.462 0.414 
 (0.331) (0.350) (0.337) (0.340) 
log(Natural capital) 0.0245* 0.0210 0.0225 0.0253* 
 (0.0136) (0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0136) 
Rule of law 0.0376***    
 (0.0106)    
Regulatory quality  -0.0312**   
  (0.0139)   
Government effectiveness   -0.0379**  
   (0.0144)  
Corruption control     0.0302*** 
    (0.00944) 
Constant 0.298** 0.324** 0.322** 0.294** 
 (0.135) (0.150) (0.140) (0.138) 
     
Observations 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.565 0.502 0.534 0.549 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Appendix 5. Do-file (commands for Stata) 
gen l_taxemp = ln(taxemp) 
gen l_nc = ln(natcap) 
Figure 1. The K-density of main variables 
kdensity gini 
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graph save den_gini 
kdensity l_taxemp 
graph save den_taxemp 
kdensity non_sal_exp 
graph save den_nse 
kdensity ruleoflaw 
graph save den_ruleoflaw 
kdensity unemployment 
graph save den_unemployment 
kdensity l_natcap 
graph save den_natcap 
graph combine den_gini.gph den_taxemp.gph den_nse.gph den_ruleoflaw.gph den_unemployment.gph 
den_natcap.gph 
Table 1. Correlation matrix 
pwcorr gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap if year==2013 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
tabstat gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, statistics (mean median min max 
sd var semean count) 
Table 3. Main estimation results 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp if year==2013, robust 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw if year==2013, robust 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment if year==2013, robust 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, robust  
Figure 2. The partial effects of explanatory variables on GINI 
avplot l_taxemp if year==2013 
avplot non_sal_exp if year==2013 
avplot ruleoflaw if year==2013 
Table 4. Additional control variable 
gen l_gdp = ln(gdp) 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap l_gdp if year==2013, robust 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap total_sch if year==2013, robust 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap prim_sch sec_sch ter_sch if year==2013, robust 
Table 5. Baseline regression with data of 2011 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap if year==2011, robust  
Table 6. Baseline regression with truncated regression and weighted least squared (WLS) estimator 
truncreg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, robust ll(0) ul(1)  
regwls gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, wvars(l_taxemp non_sal_exp 
ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap) type(loge2) robust 
Table 7. Baseline regression with GINI_WIID 
reg gini_wiid l_taxemp non_sal_exp ruleoflaw unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, robust 
Appendix 3 - Correlation matrix among institutional variables 
pwcorr ruleoflaw reg_quali gov_eff corr_con 
Appendix 4 - Baseline regression model with different institutional indicators 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp reg_quali unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, robust 
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp gov_eff unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, robust  
reg gini l_taxemp non_sal_exp corr_con unemployment l_natcap if year==2013, robust 
 
